A one-sided limit order book is modeled as a noncooperative game for n players. Agents offer various quantities of an asset at different prices p ∈ [0, P ], competing to fulfill an incoming order, whose size X is not known a priori. Players can have different payoff functions, reflecting different beliefs about the fundamental value of the asset and probability distribution of the random variable X. In [4] the existence of a Nash equilibrium was established by means of a fixed point argument.
Introduction
This paper is concerned with a continuum model of the limit order book in a stock market, viewed as a noncooperative game for n players. As in [3] our main goal is to study the existence of a Nash equilibrium, determining the optimal bidding strategies of the various agents who submit limit orders.
We assume that an external buyer asks for a random amount of X > 0 of shares of a certain asset. This external agent will buy the amount X at the lowest available price, as long as this price does not exceed a given upper bound P . One or more sellers offer various quantities of this asset at different prices, competing to fulfill the incoming order, whose size is not known a priori.
Having observed the prices asked by his competitors, each seller must determine an optimal strategy, maximizing his expected payoff. Of course, when other sellers are present, asking a higher price for a stock reduces the probability of selling it.
The model introduced in [3] was extended in [4] , assuming that agents differ from each other in various respects.
• Each agent assigns a different probability distribution to the random variable X, based on his own beliefs. An optimistic seller expects a large incoming order, which will fill most of the outstanding bids. A pessimistic seller will expect a small order, filling only the lowest priced bids. In the following, we denote by ψ i (s) = P rob.{X > s} (1.1) the probability distribution assigned by the i-th player to the random variable X.
• Each agent assigns a different fundamental value p i to the assets he is putting on sale.
In other words, to the i-th agent it would be indifferent to sell his assets at unit price p i or to keep them.
Existence of a Nash equilibrium, in this more general setting, was recently proved in [4] by means of a topological technique. However, this technique did not provide information about the uniqueness of the solution, or how to construct it. Aim of the present paper is to show that, in several cases, this Nash equilibrium solution can be found by solving a a Boundary Value Problem for a system of ODEs.
Let κ i be the total amount of assets offered for sale by the i-th agent. We use the Lagrangian variable β ∈ [0, κ i ] to label one particular asset. By a pricing strategy for the i-th seller we mean a nondecreasing map φ i : [0,
To compute the expected payoff achieved by this strategy, let φ j , j = 1 . . . , φ n , j = i be the pricing strategies adopted by the other agents, and define
be the total amount of assets put on sale at price < p by all the other agents. The expected payoff for the i-th player is then measured by
The integrand in (1.4) contains two factors. The term φ i (β) − p i is the difference between the price at which the asset β is put on sale and its actual value to the i-th player. The term ψ i β + Φ i (φ i (β) is the subjective probability (according to the i-th player) that the asset β will be actually sold.
For future reference, we record some basic assumptions on the probability distributions (1.1).
(A1) All maps s → ψ i (s), i = 1, . . . , n are continuously differentiable and satisfy
Example 1. The assumptions (A1) are satisfied if ψ i (s) = e −αs or if ψ i (s) = (1 + s) −α , for some α > 0. On the other hand, (1.6) fails if ψ i (s) = e −s 2 Definition 1. Let (φ * 1 , . . . , φ * n ) be an n-tuple of pricing strategies such that no two players put a positive amount of assets for sale at exactly the same price. We say that these strategies provide a Nash equilibrium if, calling Φ * 1 , . . . , Φ * n the corresponding functions in (1.2)-(1.3), one has
for every i = 1, . . . , n and every other pricing strategy
for the i-th player.
Remark 1. As a basic modeling assumption, the asset will always be bought from whoever seller offers the lowest price. However, if two or more sellers put a positive amount of asset for sale exactly at the same price, one needs to specify which of the agents has selling priority. This would require an additional discussion of the model. However, in a Nash equilibrium this situation never happens, because the player that does not have priority can always improve his expected payoff by slightly reducing his price.
In the general case where agents have different payoff functions, the existence of at least one Nash equilibrium was recently established in [4] . The proof relied on a sequence of discrete approximations, combined with a topological fixed point argument. Apart from the case of players with the same payoff functions, studied in [3] , the uniqueness of Nash equilibria remains an open problem.
In the present paper we seek a more explicit way to construct the functions (F 1 , . . . , F n ) in (1.2), and hence determine the equilibrium solution. Toward this goal, we introduce a boundary value problem for a a system on n ODEs, determining the functions F j . These equations are obtained by adding some auxiliary inequalities to the set of necessary conditions for optimality derived in [3] . Compared with classical literature, this problem is far from standard. It consists of a system of ODEs 8) where the right hand sides are discontinuous along the hyperplanes where F j = κ j . The boundary data take the form
together with
where p A ∈ [0, P ] is a point to be determined.
In Section 2 we give a precise description of the right hand side of (1.8), and study its properties. In Section 3 we prove the existence and uniqueness of the solution to the boundary value problem (1.8)-(1.10). As shown by a counterexample, this solution may not yield a Nash equilibrium, in general. This is because the ODEs in (1.8) are obtained by imposing some additional inequalities which are not implied by the optimality conditions. Our main result, proved in Section 4, provides various sufficient conditions in order that the solution to (1.8)-(1.10) yield a Nash equilibrium. In particular, this is always the case if either (i) there are exactly two players, or (ii) in (1.4) the probability distribution functions have the form ψ 1 (s) = · · · = ψ n (s) = e −λs , while p 1 , . . . , p n can be arbitrary.
In recent literature, models of the limit order book have been studied in [1, 5, 8, 9, 11] . For a general introduction to game theory and Nash equilibria we refer to [2, 6, 12] .
An algebraic problem
The main goal of this section is to study a class of functions Q i appearing on the right hand side of the ODEs (1.8). As a first step, we consider a set of linear equations with constraints.
there exists a unique n-tuple (x 1 , x 2 , . . . , x n ) of non-negative numbers with the following properties:
2)
Proof. 1. Consider the integer
where a n+1 . = +∞, so that the inequality in (2.5) is always satisfied when k = n. It is straightforward to check that all conditions (2.2)-(2.4) are satisfied by setting
6)
2. It remains to prove that the solution is unique. As a first step, we claim that any solution (x 1 , . . . , x n ) must be of the form (2.6)-(2.7), for some integer m ∈ {2, . . . , n}. Indeed, assume that x ℓ = 0 but x k > 0 for some ℓ < k. Then (2.2) implies j =k
Hence (2.3) is not satisfied when i = k.
3. For a given m, the formulas (2.6)-(2.7) uniquely determine the n-tuple (x 1 , . . . , x n ). To complete the proof of uniqueness, it remains to show that there exists at most one integer m such that this n-tuple satisfies the conditions (2.2)-(2.4).
Assume, on the contrary, that (x 1 , . . . , x m , 0, . . . , 0) and
This implies
This contradicts the assumption x ′ m ′ > 0, proving that the solution is unique.
Corollary 1. Given any n-tuple a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ) of strictly positive numbers (not necessarily ordered as in (2.1)), there exists a unique vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) satisfying the conditions (2.2)-(2.4).
Indeed, we can always find a permutation π of the set of indices {1, . . . , n} such that
and apply Lemma 1.
Given a = (a 1 , a 2 , . . . , a n ), we shall denote by
the unique solution of (2.2)-(2.4). Observe that, if k, ℓ are two indices such that a k = a ℓ , then by uniqueness it follows G k (a) = G ℓ (a). The next lemma collects some properties of the map G.
Lemma 2. The map G = (G 1 , . . . , G n ) is Lipschitz continuous and quasi-monotone. Namely, given two n-tuples a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) andã = (ã 1 , . . . ,ã n ), if
Proof. 1. By Corollary 1, the map G is well defined.
As shown by the proof of Lemma 1, for any given a there exists a unique subset of indices I(a) ⊆ {1, . . . , n} with cardinality m . = #I(a) such that
This implies the a priori bounds
2. From the equations (2.2)-(2.4) it follows that the map G has closed graph. Namely, given sequences
Being a locally bounded function with closed graph, G is continuous.
3. The conclusion of the lemma is clearly a consequence of the following claim:
(C) Fix any i ∈ {1 , . . . , n} and let any (n − 1)-tuple of numbers (a 1 , · · · , a i−1 , a i+1 , . . . , a n ) be given. Then the maps
are Lipschitz continuous and monotone. Namely, G i is decreasing, while all other G j for j = i are increasing w.r.t. s.
A proof of (C) will be worked out in the remaining steps.
4.
Up to a permutation of indices, it is not restrictive to assume that i = n and 0 < a 1 ≤ a 2 ≤ · · · ≤ a n−1 .
Call a(s) = (a 1 , · · · , a n−1 , s). By the continuity of G it follows that the maps s → G j (a(s)) are all continuous. If ]s − , s + [ is an open interval where the set of indices I(a(s)) remains constant, from the formula (2.12) it follows that the maps G j are all uniformly Lipschitz continuous, with s → G i (a(s)) decreasing while s → G j (a(s)) increasing for all j = i.
5.
To complete the proof of (C), it remains to show that, as s increases, there are finitely many values 0 < s 1 < s 2 < · · · < s N such that the set I(a(s)) is constant on each open interval ]s k−1 , s k [ . In turn, for any i ∈ {1, . . . , n − 1}, it suffices to show that the set I(a(s)) changes only finitely many times as s ranges in the subinterval ]a i , a i+1 [ . This clearly follows as a consequence of (2.5).
. . , a n ) provide the unique solution to the system of (n − 1) equations
15)
Lemma 3. Consider any n-tuple a = (a 1 , . . . , a n ) of strictly positive numbers, and let a ′ = (a 1 , . . . a k−1 , a k+1 , . . . a n ) be the (n − 1)-tuple obtained by removing the entry a k . For i = 1, . . . , n, let
be the solution of the corresponding system of (n − 1) equations obtained by removing a k . Then
Proof. 1. For each i = k, as a consequence of Remark 2 we have
Clearly the integrand is non-negative. Recalling (2.6) we see that
Here we use the notation x j (s) . = G j (a 1 , . . . , a k−1 , s, a k+1 , . . . , a n ), while m(s) denotes the number of non-zero components in this solution: m(s) . = #{j ; x j (s) = 0}. From the representation (2.20) it is clear that x ′ j ≥ x j for all j = k, so that (2.18) holds.
2.
To prove (2.19), we observe that it is not restrictive to assume that the a i are arranged in increasing order, as in (2.1). We consider two cases.
this implies
The same estimate holds for x ′ 2 . The conclusion thus holds with
Case 2: k ∈ {1, 2}. To fix the ideas, assume k = 2, the case k = 1 being entirely similar. We claim that, when s = a 3 ,
Indeed, the inequality introduced in (2.5)
here cannot be satisfied when ℓ = 2. Hence m(s) ≥ 3. By continuity, we can find ε > 0 such that m(s) ≥ 3 for s ∈ [a 3 − ε, a 3 ]. For i ∈ {1, 3} we now have
Choosing k 1 = 1, k 2 = 3, we reach the desired conclusion.
Remark 3. The previous analysis shows that the maps G i (a 1 , . . . , a n ) can be defined also in the case where some of the a i take the value +∞, provided that there exist at least two distinct indices j = k such that a j , a k < ∞. Indeed, one can simply define G i (a) = 0 if a i = +∞.
For future use, we recall here a standard comparison lemma for solutions to systems of ODEs, originally proved in [7] . We recall that a map G = (G 1 , . . . , G n ) : IR × R n → IR n is called quasimonotone if for every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} the following holds.
If y i =ỹ i and y j ≤ỹ j for all
Lemma 4. Assume that the map G : IR × IR n → IR n is Lipschitz continuous and quasimonotone. Let t → y(t) = (y 1 , . . . , y n )(t) and t →ỹ(t) = (ỹ 1 , . . . ,ỹ n )(t) be two solutions of the same systems of ODEsẏ = G(t, y) (2.23)
Then the following comparison properties holds.
(ii) If in addition to (2.24) one has the strict inequality y h (t 0 ) <ỹ h (t 0 ) for some index h ∈ {1, . . . , n}, then y h (t) <ỹ h (t) for all t ≥ t 0 .
The two-point boundary value problem
Given an n-tuple of pricing strategies (φ 1 , . . . , φ n ), consider the functions
If (φ 1 , . . . , φ n ) provide a Nash equilibrium in the sense of Definition 1, then the analysis in [3] has shown that the following optimality conditions must hold:
For reader's convenience, we briefly recall how (3.3) is obtained. For a given i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, if F ′ i (p) > 0 this means that the i-th player is putting something on sale at price p, hence φ i (β) = p for some β ∈ [0, κ i ]. The optimality of the strategy φ i implies that, by making a small perturbation φ i (β) = p + h, the expected payoff does not increase. Therefore
This yields (3.3). For a rigorous derivation under general assumptions we refer to [3] .
In the remainder of this section we shall construct functions F 1 , . . . , F n which satisfy these optimality conditions. In the next section, under some additional assumptions, we will prove that these functions provide a Nash equilibrium solution to the bidding game.
Without loss of generality, we assume that
Our main goal is to prove the existence of a unique solution to the following free boundary value problem.
F i (P ) = κ i for all i with the exception of at most one index i * .
(3.8)
Here G 1 , . . . , G n are the functions introduced at (2.10). The lowest asking price p A ∈ ]0, P [ is regarded as a free boundary. The index i * in (3.8), corresponding to the unique player that puts a positive amount of assets for sale at the top price P , needs also to be determined as part of the solution.
Remark 4. The necessary conditions for optimality proved in [3] yield the implication
.
These conditions alone do not uniquely determine a system of ODEs for the functions F i . For example, at each p one could choose any two indices j, k and set
Applying Lemma 1 with a i defined at (3.5), we can uniquely determine the values x i . = F ′ i (p), provided that we impose the additional inequalities
corresponding to (2.2). However, one should keep in mind that these additional inequalities do not follow from the optimality conditions. There may be Nash equilibria that do not satisfy (3.9), while the unique solution of the boundary value problem (3.6)-(3.8) may not yield a Nash equilibrium. This issue will be discussed in detail in Section 4.
Theorem 1. For i = 1, . . . , n, let the quantities κ i > 0 and the prices p i as in (3.4) be given, together with functions ψ i satisfying in (1.5)-(1.6). Then the boundary value problem (3.6)-(3.8) has a unique solution.
Proof. 1. Because of (3.5), the right hand sides of the ODEs in (3.6) are piecewise smooth, with discontinuities occurring when F i = κ i . Our construction will thus be achieved by an inductive algorithm, which restarts every time where the solution reaches a discontinuity.
INITIAL STEP. Consider an initial point q 0 ∈ ]p 2 , P [ , whose precise value will be determined later. We begin by solving the system of ODEs (3.6) with initial data (3.7). Since q 0 > p 2 , we have a 1 (q 0 , 0) < ∞, a 2 (q 0 , 0) < ∞. Hence the right hand sides of the ODEs in (3.6) are well defined and locally Lipschitz continuous. By the analysis in Section 2, this Cauchy problem has a unique local solution defined for p ≥ q 0 . This solution can be continued up to the point
Here and in the sequel we use the notation a ∧ b . = min{a, b}.
INDUCTIVE STEP. Now assume that q 0 < q 1 < · · · < q ν have been determined, and the solution has been constructed on the interval [q 0 , q ν ]. If either (i) q ν = P or (ii) the set of indices {i ; F i (q ν ) < κ i , q ν > p i } contains less than two elements, then the construction stops.
In the opposite case, we consider the set of indices
The equations (3.5)-(3.6) now yield a system of N ν . = #I ν (i.e., the cardinality of the set I ν ) differential equations for the components F i , i ∈ I ν . In addition,
This Cauchy problem, with initial data provided by the inductive step at p = q ν , has a unique local solution, defined for p ≥ q ν . This solution can be continued up to the point
This achieves the inductive step.
Clearly the algorithm must terminate after at most n − 2 steps, yielding a unique solution to (3.6)-(3.7), defined on some maximal interval [q 0 , q ♯ ]. In the remainder of the proof we will show that there exists a unique value for the minimum ask price p A such that, setting q 0 = p A , one has q ♯ = P and (3.8) holds. More precisely, writing q ♯ = q ♯ (q 0 ) to stress the dependence of q ♯ on the initial point q 0 , one has
2. In this step we prove that, for any solution of the boundary value problem (3.6)-(3.8) which is defined on the entire interval [p A , P ], all functions F i are Lipschitz continuous with a uniform Lipschitz constant (independent of p A ).
Toward this goal, choose constants m 0 , m 1 such that
Introducing the constant
Notice that, if (3.17) holds, then (3.3) implies
This provides the uniform upper bound on the Lipschitz constant of all functions F j , j = 1 . . . , n.
In the remainder of this step we thus work toward a proof of (3.17). To fix the ideas, fix an index i and assume
for some indices j ≤ i ≤ k. Assume that
In this case, as shown by the proof of Lemma 1, the sum of the two smallest elements in the n-tuple (a 1 , . . . , a n ) must be greater than a i . Hence,
Here and in the sequel we use the notation min 2 (a 1 , . . . , a n ) to denote the second smallest element of the n-tuple (a 1 , . . . , a n ).
Next, assume that
To estimate the right hand side of (3.22) we consider two cases.
On the other hand, if p j < p i then the assumption (3.21) implies
Therefore, for p ≥ p i + ε we have
From (3.20), 3.23), and (3.24) we conclude
and setting δ 0 . = P − p n , from (3.25) we deduce
proving our claim (3.17).
3.
By choosing q 0 = P − ε with ε > 0 sufficiently small, it is clear that the solution of (3.6)-(3.7) is well defined on [q 0 , P ] and satisfies F i (P ) < κ i for every i. Hence the set on the right hand side of (3.14) is nonempty and the value p A is well defined.
We claim that, if the minimum asking price p A is defined as in (3.14), then solution of the Cauchy problem (3.6)-(3.7) satisfies the terminal condition (3.8) as well.
Indeed, consider a decreasing sequence of initial points q ν → p A , with q ♯ (q ν ) = P for each ν ≥ 1. Let (F 1,ν , . . . , F n,ν ) be the corresponding solution to (3.6) with initial data
defined on the interval [p ν , P ]. By the uniform Lipschitz continuity of the functions F i,ν , proved in step 2, we can extract a subsequence converging to an n-tuple of Lipschitz functions (F 1 , . . . , F n ). It is straightforward to check that these functions provide a solution to the Cauchy problem (3.6)-(3.7) on the interval [p A , P ]. Hence q ♯ (p A ) = P and the infimum in (3.14) is actually attained as a minimum.
To prove that this solution (F 1 , . . . , F n ) also satisfies the terminal condition (3.8), we assume that, on the contrary, F j (P ) < κ j and F ℓ (P ) < κ ℓ for two distinct indices j = ℓ. We can then find a constant ε > 0 such that
Consider a strictly increasing sequence of initial points q 0,ν → p A . For each ν ≥ 1 let F ν = (F 1,ν , . . . , F n,ν ) be the corresponding solution to the Cauchy problem (3.6) with initial data (3.27). By assumption, this solution is defined on some maximal interval [q 0,ν , q ♯ ν ] with q ♯ ν < P . By quasi-monotonicity, the sequence of solutions is monotone decreasing. More precisely, for any two indices µ < ν and any i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we have
We now observe that the pointwise limit F = ( F 1 , . . . , F n ), defined as
provides a solution to the Cauchy problem (3.6)-(3.7). By uniqueness, F = F and hence
A contradiction is now obtained as follows. By the analysis in step 2, the derivatives F ′ i, ν remain uniformly bounded. In particular, we can assume
for some constant M and all ν ≥ 1. Choose δ > 0 such that M δ < ε/2. By (3.29) and (3.28), for ν sufficiently large we have
By (3.30), this implies
Therefore, q ♯ (q ν ) = P , the minimality of p A . This contradiction proves our claim, i.e. the terminal condition (3.8) is satisfied.
4.
It now remains to prove that the solution to the boundary value problem (3.6)-(3.8) is unique. Clearly, as soon as the initial point p A is chosen, the solution to the Cauchy problem (3.6)-(3.7) is unique. Consider two starting points p A < p A and let F, F be the solutions to the corresponding problems
To prove uniqueness for the boundary value problem it suffices to show:
Moreover, there exist at least two indices j, k (possibly varying with p), such that
Indeed, if F = (F 1 , . . . , F n ) is a solution to the boundary value problem (3.6)-(3.8), then F cannot be a second solution, because for some indices j, k
hence the terminal condition (3.8) fails. The uniqueness of the solution thus follows from our claim (C).
To prove (C), we proceed by induction. For i = 1, . . . , n, define
Rearranging these values in increasing order, we can write
We compare the solutions of the two Cauchy problems (3.31), (3.32). The inequalities in (3.33) can be proved by induction on ℓ = 1, . . . , N . Indeed, they trivially hold when p = p A . Assuming that (3.33) holds for p = τ ℓ , by (i) in Lemma 4 and the quasi-monotonicity of the right hand sides of (3.31)-(3.32) we conclude that the same inequalities are true for
The strict inequalities in (3.34) will also be proved by induction on the intervals [τ ℓ , τ ℓ+1 [ .
we conclude that there are at least two indices j = k such that For any p, define the sets of indices
To achieve the inductive step, consider anyp ∈ ]τ ℓ−1 , τ ℓ [ . By the inductive hypothesis, there exists two indices j = k such that
Two cases will be considered.
Observe that this implies
In this case, using part (ii) of Lemma 4 we first conclude that the inequalities (3.37) hold for all p ∈ [p, τ ℓ ]. A second application of Lemma 4 shows that the same strict inequalities hold also for p ∈ [τ ℓ , τ ℓ+1 [ . CASE 2: τ ℓ ∈ { P j , P k }. To fix the ideas, assume τ ℓ = P j . = min{p ; F j (p) = κ j }. Observe that in this case we must have F j (p) = κ j for all p ≥ τ ℓ−1 . Otherwise the relations
would provide a contradiction with part (ii) of Lemma 4. We are thus in the situation shown in Fig We claim that there exists at least two distinct indices h, h ′ ∈ {1, . . . , n} such that
Suppose on the contrary that (3.38) fails. Then there exists an index k * such that
To achieve a contradiction, observe that (3.39) implies
of positive measure such that F ′ j (p) > 0 for every p ∈ S. By (2.19) in Lemma 3, for every p ∈ S we can find at least one index h ∈ L(p), h = k * (possibly depending on p), such that
This is clearly in contradiction with (3.40). We thus conclude that (3.38) holds.
If now τ ℓ = P , we are done. Otherwise, using again part (ii) of Lemma 4 we conclude that
This completes the inductive step in the proof of our claim (C).
Computing the Nash equilibrium
Let (F 1 , . . . , F n ) be a solution of the boundary value problem (3.6)-(3.8). These functions determine a unique n-tuple of bidding strategies. Namely, for every p ≤ P , the value F i (p) determines the total amount of assets put on sale by the i-th player at price < p. By (3.8) there can be at most one player, say the agent i * , who puts a positive amount of assets for sale exactly at the price P . However, as explained in Remark 4, this solution to the boundary value problem does not necessarily yield a Nash equilibrium. We further illustrate this point by an example.
Example 2. Consider a bidding game for three sellers. We assume
The values 0 < κ 1 < κ 2 = κ 3 and P will be chosen later, so that the minimum ask price will turn out to be 
We choose κ 1 = ε > 0 sufficiently small. Observe that, when p ≈ p A = 5, by (4.1) the right hand sides of (4.4) take the values F ′ i (p) ≈ 1/8. Therefore, we can uniquely determine the value q(ε) .
For p > q(ε) one has
Given ε > 0 sufficiently small and P >> 5 we set
5 dp 2(p − 1) + P q(ε) dp 4(p − 4)
Notice that, (4.5) and (4.7) together imply
With the above choice of κ i , the triple (F 1 , F 2 , F 3 ) provides the unique solution to the boundary value problem.
We claim that, if P is sufficiently large, the above solution is not a Nash equilibrium, because the strategy of Player 1 is not optimal. Indeed, when Player 1 puts on sale a total amount κ 1 = ε of assets at price p ≈ p A = 5, for ε > 0 small his expected payoff is
On the other hand, if he puts all his assets for sale at the top price P , his expected payoff is
(4.10)
When P sufficiently large we have J † 1 (ε) > J 1 (ε), hence the first strategy is not optimal.
In the remainder of this section we seek additional conditions, which guarantee that the ntuple of strategies (F 1 , . . . , F n ) obtained by solving the boundary value problem (3.6)-(3.8) provides a Nash equilibrium to the bidding game. Toward this goal, we shall use Lemma 5. A sufficient condition in order that the strategy φ i for the i-th player be optimal is To prove the lemma, for any admissible strategy ϕ : [0, κ i ] → [0, P ] we simply observe that
To proceed further, we need to introduce an additional condition:
(H) For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} and everyp < P , the following implication holds.
If G i (a 1 (p), . . . , a i (p), . . . a n (p)) > 0 for somep ∈ ]p i , P ], then for every p ∈ ]p, P [ one has
, a i+1 (p), . . . , a n (p) > 0 . (4.12)
Roughly speaking, the assumption (H) means that, if i-th player puts some asset for sale at pricep, then he continues to put assets for sale at every price p ∈ [p, q i ], for some q i such that F i (q i ) = κ i . The only reason for which he does not put assets for sale at prices p > q i is that he simply does not have anything more to sell. In this case, recalling (3.5), we have Proof. 1. For every i ∈ {1, . . . , n} we need to show that the strategy φ i of the i-th player is a best reply to the strategies adopted by all other players. By Lemma 5, this is the case if (4.11) holds. Calling
, (4.14)
our conclusion will be reached by proving that E(p) ≥ 0 if p < φ(β), E(p) ≤ 0 if p > φ(β). 
Hence, if (4.27) holds for p =p, the same holds for all p ≥p.
